The New Opiate Epidemic by Patrick Radden Keefe
THE NEW OPIATE EPIDEMIC
Patrick Radden Keefe | February 4, 2016
The Century Foundation | tcf.org
1The Century Foundation | tcf.org
On the subject of narcotics, American public discourse 
is prone to alarmism, but it is not an exaggeration to 
say that the United States is currently experiencing 
an epidemic of opiate addiction. To be exact, we are 
in the grip of two related epidemics: one involving 
legal, regulated prescription painkillers, and the other 
involving black market heroin. Chemically, these two 
types of drugs have a great deal in common, and both 
are devastatingly addictive. But the rise in pill addiction 
and the rise in heroin addiction are linked on a deeper 
causal level, as well. 
Drug overdoses now kill more Americans than car 
accidents, and most of those overdoses are from 
opiates. Heroin-related deaths have quadrupled 
since 2000, leading to what the New York Times has 
suggested may be “the worst drug overdose epidemic 
in United States history.” Former attorney general 
Eric Holder described the rise in heroin addiction as a 
“public health crisis,” with heroin overdoses leading to 
10,574 deaths in 2014 (see Figure 1).
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But in fact, the spike in heroin abuse is an outgrowth 
of a much broader and in some ways more pernicious 
problem—the widespread addiction to prescription 
painkillers. Pharmaceutical opioid overdoses have 
also quadrupled since 2000, leading to 18,893 deaths 
in 2014 (see Figure 2)—almost double the number of 
heroin overdoses for the same year. The suppliers of 
these drugs are not street-corner dealers, but ostensibly 
respectable physicians, and behind them, multibillion-
dollar pharmaceutical companies, with squadrons of 
lawyers and lobbyists.
According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 
in 2012, American health care providers issued 259 
million prescriptions for opioid painkillers, the equivalent 
of a bottle of pills for every single adult in the country. 
According to the journalist Sam Quinones, a hundred 
million Americans suffer from chronic pain, and most 
of them receive prescription opiates. Quinones has 
written a book, Dreamland: The True Tale of America’s 
Opiate Epidemic, which is a landmark work of reporting 
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FIGURE 1
HEROIN OVERDOSE DEATHS
FIGURE 2
PRESCRIPTION OPIOID OVERDOSE DEATHS
Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse, “Overdose Death Rates,” http://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates, revised December 15, 2015.
Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse, “Overdose Death Rates,” http://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates, revised December 15, 2015.
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and storytelling that brings together the licit and illicit 
strands of this story and illustrates, in vivid detail, how 
pharmaceutical painkillers and heroin from Mexico are 
linked on a continuum of addiction.
XALISCO BOYS
As a longtime reporter for the Los Angeles Times, 
Quinones has decades of experience on America’s 
southwest border and in Mexico. The most arresting 
and unfamiliar parts of Dreamland are the chapters 
that chronicle a generation of young heroin dealers 
who hail from the same small corner of Mexico, a rural 
area around the town of Xalisco, in the western state of 
Nayarit. The “Xalisco Boys,” as Quinones calls them, 
pioneered an unusual business model. 
Most Mexican drug cartels are in the business of 
producing and exporting narcotics like marijuana or 
methamphetamine, or smuggling cocaine from the 
Andes. As such, they tend not to play a major role in retail 
distribution inside the United States, preferring to sell 
to regional wholesalers who then assume the risks and 
exposure of dealing with gangs and with a strung-out, 
unreliable clientele in local drug distribution networks. 
But the Xalisco Boys were vertically integrated “from 
the farm to the arm,” as drug agents sometimes say: 
they produced their own heroin in Mexico, shipped it 
across the border, and then operated retail distribution 
cells that sold directly to addicts in communities across 
the United States. 
By interviewing Xalisco Boys, the customers they sold 
to, and the cops who pursued them, Quinones is able 
to elucidate their unusual methods in unusually vivid 
detail: 
Each heroin cell or franchise has an owner in 
Xalisco, Nayarit, who supplies the cell with 
heroin. The owner doesn’t often come to the 
United States. He communicates only with 
the cell manager, who . . . runs the business for 
him. Beneath the cell manager is a telephone 
operator. . . . The operator stays in an apartment 
all day and takes calls. The calls come from 
addicts, ordering their dope. Under the operator 
are several drivers, paid a weekly wage and given 
housing and food. Their job is to drive the city 
with their mouths full of little uninflated balloons 
of black tar heroin, twenty-five or thirty at a time 
in one mouth. They look like chipmunks. They 
have a bottle of water at the ready so if police 
pull them over, they swig the water and swallow 
the balloons.
The Xalisco Boys are purely a delivery operation: like 
any other retail business, they discovered that there can 
be distinct advantages to foregoing a brick-and-mortar 
storefront. Rather than assume the risk of keeping 
heroin at a single house where junkies (or the cops) 
will know where to find it, the Xalisco Boys come to 
the customer. Each driver hits the streets with a small 
enough volume of heroin in his car that if the authorities 
pull him over, they will not be able to make a major case 
(because criminal charges in these cases are generally 
tied to the volume of product the dealer is arrested 
with). 
The Xalisco Boys tend to be young and clean cut, 
Quinones explains. They drive anonymous sedans, 
and after working in a given market for a few months, 
they cycle out of the country and return to their home 
village in Mexico, with a small fortune in earnings. Each 
departing driver is replaced by a new anonymous face, 
with no criminal record, which further compounds the 
challenges for law enforcement officers trying to make 
a case. 
Whereas retail distribution of illegal drugs is often 
characterized by violent turf wars, the Xalisco Boys 
never carried guns. They competed among themselves, 
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driving down prices, but did not engage in bloody gang 
wars. During the 1990s, they targeted small and mid-
sized cities in the American heartland, avoiding large 
cities such as New York where there was already an 
entrenched hierarchy of heroin suppliers. According 
to Quinones, they tended as a rule to avoid doing 
business with African Americans, preferring to sell 
to whites. “Guys from Xalisco figured out what white 
people—especially middle-class white kids—want most 
is service, convenience,” he writes. At any hour of the 
day, an addict could telephone a number and know that 
within thirty minutes, a polite driver would meet them 
in a nearby parking lot or show up at their door, ready 
to make a sale. 
When the Xalisco Boys set up shop in a new area, they 
would identify potential customers through a devilish 
but ingenious device: they would target methadone 
clinics, where they were sure to find people coping 
with heroin addiction, and offer them free samples. 
Most of these dealers lacked much formal education, 
but they proved remarkably adept at marketing 
their product, and at developing relationships with 
customers. Quinones relates harrowing stories of 
addicts summoning the strength to quit the drug and 
informing their dealers that they were done with heroin, 
only to have the dealers arrive at their house, minutes 
later, to express support for the decision—and to offer 
one last hit, for free. 
Gradually, as Dreamland relates, the Xalisco Boys 
expanded from Southern California to cities and 
towns across America. The type of heroin produced 
in Mexico—black tar heroin, known as such because it 
has more impurities than white powder heroin, but is 
just as addictive—was originally found only on the West 
Coast, but eventually it began to appear east of the 
Mississippi, with increasing regularity. 
You might think that the fact that heroin is typically 
injected would pose a challenge for dealers looking to 
attract new customers. Many people have a phobia of 
needles. But as the Xalisco Boys continued to expand, 
they found out that this did not seem to be a problem—
because someone had prepared the territory ahead of 
them, creating a vast marketplace of opiate consumers, 
hungry for more.
A TIDE OF PILLS
For most of their history in American, opiates were 
typically prescribed only for short-term pain, or for 
chronic pain associated with terminal illnesses. But in 
the last decades of the twentieth century, a myth took 
hold in the medical community that these drugs were 
not addictive, and doctors began prescribing them 
much more widely. By the 1990s, Quinones writes, 
there was “a new conventional wisdom that science had 
advanced and now knew that opiates wouldn’t addict 
a pain patient.” This was completely untrue, based 
more on wishful thinking (and nakedly self-interested 
marketing campaigns by drug companies) than on 
actual medical science. But it was embraced as a new 
orthodoxy. 
The 1990s were the decade of the blockbuster drug, 
and, in 1996, the company Purdue Pharma introduced a 
new pill, OxyContin, that was intended to revolutionize 
the treatment of pain. To that end, OxyContin was an 
astonishing success, though not, perhaps, in precisely 
the manner that its parent company had predicted.
OxyContin was designed with a hard shell, intended to 
operate on a “delayed release” mechanism, calibrating 
the diffusion of the drug into the bloodstream in a way 
that might prevent the dramatic highs and lows that can 
often lead to addiction. In practice, however, the hard 
shell did little to prevent OxyContin from becoming 
habit forming. 
Furthermore, in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, Purdue and other pharmaceutical companies 
pushed aggressively to have doctors prescribe 
5The Century Foundation | tcf.org
pharmaceutical painkillers for more and more 
conditions. Bad back? Sore knee? Football injury? 
Toothache? OxyContin was frequently the answer. 
“This was a vast new market for an opiate painkiller,” 
Quinones writes, and the market was vast indeed: 
if roughly one-third of the American population 
can be said to suffer from some sort of chronic pain, 
then the potential for sales growth was astronomical. 
Pharmaceutical reps received big bonuses for pushing 
their products with doctors. Drug companies furnished 
physicians with notepads that featured product names, 
so that every time the doctors took a phone call and 
jotted a note, their pain pills might come to mind. 
One extraordinary dividend of Quinones’ decision 
to tell the story of both white collar pharmaceutical 
executives and black market drug pushers is the 
uncanny similarities that emerge in their approaches. 
Like the Xalisco Boys loitering outside the methadone 
clinic, the pharma companies liked to offer free samples:
Purdue offered OxyContin coupons to 
physicians, who could in turn give them to 
patients for a onetime free prescription at a 
participating pharmacy. By the time Purdue 
discontinued the program, thirty-four thousand 
coupons had been redeemed.
The result of this corporate push was the 
democratization of opiate addiction. Military veterans. 
Housewives. Athletes. (Quinones suggests that 
“football was almost a gateway to addiction.”) One 
addict and dealer describes coming out of jail in 2007 
to find a completely changed landscape. In the past, 
opiate abuse was prevalent only in “a certain group of 
people,” he tells Quinones. Now, “it was a certain group 
of people plus everybody else. Cops’ kids. Poor kids, 
rich kids, smart kids, dumb kids.” 
As the use of prescription opioids deepened and 
spread, an increasing number of people began to 
use these drugs in a manner that was obviously 
nonmedical—and a new cadre of unscrupulous doctors 
proved all too willing to furnish these customers with 
prescriptions. Quinones pinpoints the small city of 
Portsmouth, Ohio, as the home of the original “pill 
mill.” He profiles a doctor, David Proctor, who was so 
prolific with his prescription pad and so influential on 
the younger doctors he hired and trained that one law 
enforcement officer gave Proctor the nickname “Ray 
Kroc”—after the businessman who built McDonalds 
into a national chain. 
Like the Mexican drug peddlers, the doctors and 
pharma executives could count on the peculiar 
susceptibility that the American people have to 
addiction. The United States consumes 83 percent of 
the world’s oxycodone (the opiate in OxyContin) and 
99 percent of the world’s hydrocodone (the opiate in 
Vicodin). In fact, drugs containing hydrocodone are the 
most prescribed medications in the country, according 
to Quinones—136 million prescriptions a year. Sales of 
oxycodone increased almost tenfold between 1999 and 
2010—and during that same period, tens of millions of 
Americans began using prescription pills non-medically.
As opioid use exploded, the pharmaceutical companies 
paid lip service to the idea of taking potential abuse 
seriously, but the reality is that they were conspicuously 
slow to acknowledge the addictive properties of their 
products. More to the point, addiction and abuse 
were good for their bottom line: today, sales of opioid 
painkillers generate over $9 billion a year. (In 2007, 
Purdue, the maker of OxyContin, paid over $600 
million in fines for misleading the public about the 
drug’s risks.)
FROM PILL TO NEEDLE
The logic of addiction is one of escalation. A patient 
taking pain pills on a certain schedule may start to 
take them more frequently—because the pain returns 
faster. If the dosage effectiveness wanes, she can suck 
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on the time-release coating, dissolving it and creating 
a more immediate and intense high. She may begin to 
crush the pills and snort them. (Quinones points out 
that a sticker on bottles of OxyContin which advised 
consumers not to grind the pills may have functioned as 
a warning label for some users, but it was an instruction 
manual for others.) 
With tolerance for the drug growing, an addict is always 
seeking to recreate the intensity of that first high, which 
may mean that after snorting OxyContin in powder 
form, she will start dissolving the pills and shooting 
them directly into her bloodstream with a needle. 
Addicts who have exhausted their doctors’ largesse 
can rely on a robust black market for painkillers, but 
with a street value of $1 per milligram for OxyContin, 
addiction can get expensive, and this is where the 
transition to heroin occurs: black tar heroin is cheaper, 
and easier to procure—through the kind of customer-
oriented delivery service offered by the Xalisco Boys—
than black market OxyContin. As a result, it becomes 
simple, even logical, for large numbers of pill addicts to 
graduate to heroin, and this is the actual explanation for 
the rise in heroin addiction and overdoses. 
According to Quinones, many of the Xalisco Boys did 
not even realize that they had stumbled onto a market 
that was already primed for them—a country full of 
addicts who have been prepared for heroin by our 
own legal pharmaceutical industry, in the name of pain 
management. 
THE ROAD TO RECOVERY:
A NEW COMPASSION?
While the challenges associated with the crisis of opiate 
addiction are formidable, one sign of promise is that 
the country seems to be waking up to the gravity of 
this issue. Until fairly recently, news stories and political 
speeches tended to address either the rise in heroin 
overdoses or the quiet scourge of painkiller addiction. 
But thanks to the work of Quinones and others, it is 
becoming increasingly untenable to tell one story 
without the other. 
On the 2016 campaign trail, presidential candidates 
from both parties have been encouragingly forthright 
in discussing the problem and committing to take it 
on. Hillary Clinton recently announced a $10 billion 
plan to combat drug addiction. Jeb Bush has publicly 
recounted how his daughter struggled with prescription 
pills and was jailed twice. Carly Fiorina has related the 
story of how her own step-daughter died in 2009 after 
a battle with prescription drugs, saying, “I buried a child 
to addiction.” 
In fact, in Dreamland, Quinones observes that one 
potentially hopeful development to emerge from 
this devastating sequence of trends may be a slightly 
gentler national approach to addiction, in which 
families are pushing to treat addiction not as a crime 
but as a public health problem. This change in tone is 
a reflection, at least in part, of shifting demographics. 
Heroin use is climbing in all groups, but the most 
pronounced growth is in the white population: nearly 
90 percent of those who tried heroin for the first time 
in the last decade were white. A recent headline in the 
New York Times captures the stark racial dynamics of 
this change of heart: “In Heroin Crisis, White Families 
Seek Gentler War on Drugs.” Some of the very same 
political constituencies that in the past demanded 
a “zero tolerance” approach to drug crimes are now 
appealing for a reconsideration. 
The irony is not lost on Quinones:
[ C]oincidentally or not, this change of heart was 
happening among conservatives just as opiate 
addiction was spreading among both rural and 
middle-class white kids across the country, 
though perhaps most notably in the deepest 
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red counties and states. Drug enslavement and 
death, so close at hand, were touching the lives, 
and softening the hearts, of many Republican 
lawmakers and constituents. I’ll count this as a 
national moment of Christian forgiveness. But 
I also know that it was a forgiveness that many 
of these lawmakers didn’t warm to when urban 
crack users were the defendants.
But whatever the provenance of this revised philosophy 
of criminal justice, it may end up representing a 
welcome and durable improvement in this country’s 
fraught policy stance toward addiction and narcotics. 
If the country begins to perceive drug addicts as sick 
people in need of treatment, rather than marginal 
criminals who should be relegated indefinitely to the 
prison system, that will be a major shift in outlook, and 
a promising development for addicts and their families 
and communities—and for our over-subscribed prison 
system, as well. 
But that would be a gradual tectonic shift. More 
surprising are the near-term, common-sense solutions 
that are—or are not—being employed. One tool 
currently used is prescription monitoring databases, 
which physicians can consult in order to make sure that 
patients are not receiving multiple prescriptions from 
different doctors. These databases now exist in nearly 
every state. Yet some doctors refuse to use them.
The CDC has also developed a set of nonbinding 
guidelines to advise physicians on how they should 
prescribe opioid painkillers. The draft guidelines 
counsel doctors to prescribe these drugs only as a 
last resort for chronic pain, after trying other drugs 
or physical therapy. The CDC would also advise 
doctors to prescribe the smallest amount of the drugs, 
and the shortest course of treatment for acute pain. 
Yet the guidelines have met with intense, organized 
opposition from the pharmaceutical lobby, which has 
argued that even though the advice is nonbinding, if 
it were adopted by insurers or hospitals, it might block 
patient access to medications. Of course, there may be 
entirely justifiable grounds for tinkering with the draft 
guidelines, but in the nature of the federal bureaucracy, 
sometimes postponing a reform is all that is required 
to kill it. 
It is impossible to read a book like Dreamland and 
not come to the conclusion that Purdue and the 
other companies that manufactured and marketed 
prescription painkillers share a considerable degree 
of moral culpability for the current opiate epidemic. 
You might think, in light of their role in causing all this 
sickness and death, that company executives would 
feel some compunction about fighting reforms which, 
by curbing addiction, will hurt their profits. But then, 
these companies have something in common with 
the Xalisco Boys—selling drugs that are abused by 
addicts—and in doing so, like the Xalisco Boys, they are 
amoral and efficient.
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